

Appendix

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Part 1. Summary of the EITI goals

Institutional goals

Goal I-1: Brand the EITI globally and nationally

Goal I-2: Establish (EITI) transparency as a norm globally and nationally

Goal I-3: Increase EITI support, participation, and compliance by governments

Goal I-4: Establish multi-stakeholder groups as the organizational basis and promote multi-stakeholder model of governance

Operational goals

Goal O-1: Establish a clear EITI standard

Goal O-2: Increase state capacity to implement the EITI standard and report in timely and comprehensible manner

Goal O-3: Increase public understanding, debate, and influence of natural resource management

Goal O-4: Ensure civil society's effective participation in multi-stakeholder groups

Developmental goals

Goal D-1: Increasing revenues that are returned to the society through reduced corruption

Goal D-2: Improve investment climate, increase aid flows, and promote fairer government share of revenues

Goal D-3: Promote good governance, sustainable development, and improved living standards

Part 2. Summary of studies included in the meta-study according to type, methods, sample, time period, and how they assess the 11 sub-goals identified in the article

Coding

Type

- 1 – Commissioned by the EITI
- 2 – Non peer-review, independent study
- 3 – Peer-review, independent study

Method

- 1 – Qualitative
- 2 – Quantitative
- 3 – Other

Goals

- S – Success
- M – Mixed results
- F – Failure
- T – Too early to say

Study	Type	Method	Time period	Sample	Institutional goals				Operational goals				Developmental goals		
					1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3
Hilson & Maconachie (2009)	3	3					M						T		T
Rainbow insight (2009)	2	1		Cameroon		S	M	S		S					
Shaxson (2009)	2	1	1999-2008	Nigeria		S				M	F	M	F		F
Ölcer (2009)	2	1 and 2	2002-2008	26 resource rich countries		M	S			M	F	F	F		
Haufler (2010)	3	3				S	S								
EITI (2010)	1	3		Sub-Saharan Africa								S	S	S	
Kemblusek (2010)	2	1		Nigeria		S				M	F	F	F		
Aaronson and Brinkerhoff (2011)	3	1	2008	EITI countries (survey sent to 23 countries and 38 firms)							F	F			
Carbonnier & al. (2011)	3	1	1999-2009	Azerbaijan and Nigeria					S		F	M			
Gillies & Heuty (2011)	3	3				S					F	S			
Randall and Blamo (2011)	1	1		Liberia							M				
Scanteam (2011)	2	1 and 2	2000-2009			S	S	S	S	S	S	M			F
Dykstra (2011)	2	2	2009-2010	Stakeholder survey			F	S		M		S			
Rich & Warner (2012)	3	1		Liberia		S	M			S	S	S	T	T	T
Smith & al. (2012)	3	1		Madagascar								F	F		F
Schmaljohann (2013)	2	2	2004-2011	81 developing countries										S	
Søreide & Truex. (2013)	3	1				S						F			
Albania EITI (2014)	1	2	2014	Public survey, Albania							M				
Corrigan (2014)	3	2	1995-2009	Global			S								M
EITI MDTF (2014)	1					S			S	S					

Etter (2014)	2	2	2002-2010	Peru and Mali			S					M	M		
Fineberg (2014)	3	1		USA			M	S							
Ihugba (2014)	3	3		Nigeria			M			S					
Öge (2014)	3	1		Azerbaijan		S	M	S		S		S	F		F
Russell (2014)	3	1		USA				S				S			
Short (2014)	3	1					S		S						
Wilson and Van Alestine (2014)	2	1		Azerbaijan, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Uganda		S	S		S		M	M			
Bickham (2015)	2	3		ICMM countries and companies		S	S		M						
Furstenberg (2015)	3	1		Kyrgyzstan				F				F			
Poretti (2015)	3	1		Iraq					S	S					
Ofori and Lujala (2015)	3	1		Ghana				F			F				
Rich & Moberg (2015)	1	3		EITI countries		S	S					M			
Sovacool & Andrews (2015)	3	2	2006-2012	Liberia and Azerbaijan		S	M			S		M	F		F
Sturesson and Zobel (2015)	3	1		Uganda		F	F								
Westenberg and Georg-Wagner (2015)	2	3		EITI countries						S					
Andrews (2016)	3	1		Ghana				F				F			
David-Barret & Okamura (2016)	3	2		Developing countries	S	S	S								S
Kasekende et al (2016)	3	2	2002-2012	76 resource rich countries			S						F		
Lujala and Epremian (2016)	2	3									F				
Papayrakis et al 2016	3	2	2002-2011	Global			S						S		
Phillips & Whiting (2016)	3	2		EITI countries											F
Sovacool et al (2016)	3	2	1996-2014	Global		S	S					F	F	F	F
Öge (2016a)	3	2	2006-2013	46 resource rich countries (EITI and non-EITI)			S			S			F	S	
Öge (2016b)	3	2	2014	Global, cross-section										S	
Neumann et al (2016)	2	1 and 2	2000-2014	98 countries, cases: DRC and Mozambique		S	M			S	M			S	
Bebbington et al (forthcoming)	3	1		Peru, Colombia and Peru			S								
Malden (forthcoming)	3	2	2003-2014	Global (167 countries)										S	
Öge (forthcoming)	3	1 and 2		Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan							F	F			
Villar and Papayrakis (forthcoming)	3	2	2002-2014	Zambia									S		
Corrigan (forthcoming)	3	2	1997-2014	Global (186 countries)									F	S	

Part 3. Specific supporting statements from each study

Study	Institutional goals				Operational goals				Development goals			Supportive statements
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	
Hilson & Maconachie (2009)			M						T		T	*the analysis that follows argues that systems of good governance must first be in place in order for the objectives of the EITI to be fulfilled. (p 58) (D-1,D-2) *This discussion, however, has argued that those driving the EITI have diagnosed the challenge far too superficially in sub-Saharan Africa." (p 92) (D-1,D-2); *In fact, among Africa's 16 EITI potential signatory countries, in the 1990s, "democratic elections" led to a change in government in only Mali and Sao Tome. (p 64) (I-3)
Rainbow insight (2009)		S	M	S		S						*The EITI has also been effective in raising awareness of the importance of transparency and its links to sustained development. (p 4) (I-2) *In particular, the EITI must be applauded for its role in promoting dialogue between governments and civil society in many countries where that had never happened before. By promoting such a dialogue, EITI has opened a pathway for similar, multi-stakeholder discussions in other issue-areas. (p 4) (I-4) *We would summarize the views that we have collected as follows: EITI is seen as a success simply by the fact that it exists, with its infrastructure, processes, policies and procedures having now been established. Ensuring that countries now progress from being Candidates through the validation pipeline is regarded by stakeholders as being of prime importance (p 4) (O-2) *While implementation on the African continent is mixed in the eyes of stakeholders, with some countries making continuing good progress while others are stalling, its overall influence has been beneficial. (p 5) (I-3)
Shaxson (2009)		S				M	F	M	F		F	*Although NEITI did not drive reforms, it did shape some of the outcomes – notably the audit reports – of processes of reform. (p 2) (I-2) *Civil society is supposed to be a key end user of EITI reports, but NEITI has performed poorly in this respect. NEITI's attempts to build capacity in civil society have shown meagre results: although it has informed civil society it is hard to find evidence that it has significantly empowered or energized it, or enabled it in any serious way to 'call Nigeria's rulers to account', as some have put it (p vii) (O-3, O-4). *NEITI does have some significant successes to its name, but these do not match up to its or EITI's core mandates and goals, and it is hard to argue that it has delivered sustained better governance or better lives for ordinary Nigerians (p 43) (D-1, D-3). *Almost six years after its launch in 2002, 26 resource-rich countries and 40 extractive corporations had signed up to the initiative ² . Apart from the Group of 8, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 12 governments, 80 institutional investors and a number of multilateral organisations and civil society groups support the EITI through political, technical or financial means. (p 9) (I-3)
Ölcer (2009)		M	S			M	F	F	F			*The EITI has helped to direct the attention of the international development community towards a sector that has traditionally been cloaked in secrecy. (p 36) (I-2)

												<p>*Table 2 page 19 shows that 10 out of 24 countries had produced reports (O-2)</p> <p>*In their view the existence of some embryonic instances of societal movements opposing central power should not be taken as representing a strong civil society as the organisational capacity of these movements is still very limited. Some voices from civil society organisations confirm their limitations within the EITI framework (p27) (O-3, O-4)</p> <p>*So far, the EITI has not managed to improve the overall corruption perceptions of the countries implementing it. (p 36) (D-1)</p>
Haufler (2010)		S	S									<p>*The EITI, while initially very weak, could build on the intersecting advocacy campaigns and networks to slowly expand the scope and make-up of the program. While it is far from a strong global institution, the EITI has successfully embedded itself in other institutions which further reinforce its aims (p68) (I-2)</p>
EITI (2010)							S	S	S			<p>*In most cases, EITI activities are contributing to larger-scale efforts at reducing corruption, improving public financial management and improving the business operating environment." (p3) (D-2)</p> <p>*Fifteen states became candidates in 2009, a sudden increase in commitments that indicates increasing acceptance of resource revenue transparency and the EITI.(p 66) (I-3)</p>
Keblusek (2010)		S				M	F	F	F			<p>*The audit reports contributed in an important way to providing greater transparency in Nigeria's oil industry. By going far beyond the basic core requirements of global EITI, they have aided both insiders and outsiders to understand the big picture of Nigerian oil (p 13) (I-2)</p> <p>*However, while the first audit covering the years 1999-2004 was completed in 2006 and released the same year, the second audit – covering the year 2005 – was completed in 2007, yet its release was delayed for two years. (p 14) (O-2)</p> <p>*As the number of governments implementing EITI began to grow, it became increasingly clear to NGOs, policymakers, scholars and the EITI Board itself that EITI was not really working. It did not require governments to ensure that citizens were able to comment on what was being reported by the extractive firms and the governments (p 11) (O-3)</p> <p>* These capacity building programs are helpful, but they are not sufficient to ensure effective civil society participation.(p 16) (O-4)</p> <p>*Perhaps the long delay was an attempt to hide internal shortcomings with the Nigerian governmental oil sector. One of the major findings of the second audit (2005) was that the stateowned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation had failed to pay taxes and royalties to the government estimated in the range of \$US4.7 billion (p 14) (D-1)</p>
Aaronson and Brinkerhoff (2011)							F	F				<p>*Despite progress and potential, many EITI-adopting nations struggle to work consistently and effectively with civil society. Partnership is not as effective as it could be for two reasons: First, the partners (governments, civil society, and business) have different visions of EITI. Second, some implementing governments have not allowed civil society to fully participate in the process or consistently provided civil society with the information they need to hold their governments to account" (p 3) (O-4)</p> <p>*the public is essentially a silent partner, limiting the ability of the EITI to succeed as a counterweight to corruption (p 4) (O-3)</p>
Carbonnier & al. (2011)				S			F	M				<p>*The EITI has shown a remarkable capacity to evolve since its inception. The twelve general principles adopted in 2003 (EIT10) were based on the assumption that transparency over payments made by extractive firms to host governments were critical to avert the resource curse. (p 251) (O-1)</p> <p>* MSG and CSOs cannot deliver accountability (p 261) (O-4)</p>

												*All three countries have put in place functioning MSGs and National Secretariats with good links to central government (p 22) (I-4)
Rich & Warner (2012)		S	M			S	S	S	T	T	T	*The EITI is therefore a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for peace, stability, and improved resource governance—as is evident in Liberia, where, despite successful implementation of the EITI, no one is yet better fed, or in school, or receiving medicines because of the EITI. (p 206) (D-1, D-2, D-3) *The results achieved by the LEITI process were made possible through the personal commitment of the president; the dedication of the LEITI Multi-Stakeholder Steering Group, which is the governing body of the LEITI; and the shared commitment of all stakeholders, including the extractive companies (205) (O-4) Although the report itself does not provide full answers to these questions, the LEITI has created a forum in which these and other questions can be discussed with both the companies and the government: openly, frankly, and in a safe and noncombative environment. The communities—and indeed all Liberians— have also used the opportunity to raise questions about how money is being allocated and used, and whether communities are receiving a fair return for their resources. (p 205) (O-2, O-3) *First, the publication of unresolved discrepancies is viewed as evidence of a new spirit of transparency, in which the government is not concealing weaknesses or inconvenient facts (p 208) (O-2) *Although the number of countries participating in the EITI has expanded rapidly to thirty, only half of the countries have produced EITI reports detailing what companies claim to have paid to the government in taxes and royalties, and what the government claims to have receive (p 202) (I-3)
Smith & al. (2012)								F	F		F	*The Regional Coordinator role within the PSC acts as the civil society representative on the regional EITI Multi-Stakeholder Group(MSG) and will represent the Anosy Region on the national EITI MSG. Although a highly motivated individual with grassroots connections in his own vocational field, he admitted that he was unable to gather or represent the views and opinions of the wide spectrum of society within the remit of the PSC (p246) (O-4). *As a consequence of the manipulation of stakeholder representatives at multiple levels in countries with inherent corruption the evolution of civil society engagement as a means of improving public accountability, reducing corruption and achieving good governance cannot meet the expectations of the international community without significant external support and intervention (p 249) (D-1, D-3)
Schmaljohann (2013)										S		Foreign direct investment increases in countries joining the EITI on average by around two percentage points (p 3). (D-2)
Søreide & Truex. (2013)		S						F				*The combination of very different incentives among stakeholders represented may create barriers for the functioning of a multi-stakeholder group. The more a multi-stakeholder group is supposed to target vested interests and corruption, the more obvious are the conflicting incentives within the group. and detrimental effects." (p 210) (O-4) *One example is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which has introduced a new standard for revenue transparency in the mining and petroleum sectors. (p 204) (I-2)
Albania EITI (2014)						M						The survey showed minimum level of awareness of EITI initiative. Therefore, the development and implementation of a new Communication Strategy was considered an immediate need. The Secretariat selected an Individual Consultant for preparation of Communication Strategy (p 9) (M-3)
Corrigan (2014)			S								M	*However, these findings should not det er the greater mission of making the resource sector more transparent and holding governments more accountable.(p 29) (D-3) *The EITI has had success in recruiting resource rich countries to become members. (p 17) (I-3)

EITI MDTF 2014 report		S			S	S						<p>*Under the EITI Standard, requirements move from a narrow focus on revenue transparency to the transparency of key data across the EI value chain. (p V) (O-1)</p> <p>*Over the past year EITI has continued to gain momentum as an international standard recognized as a benchmark worldwide on transparency in extractive (p 7) (I-2)</p> <p>* The number of EITI implementing countries continues to rise, reaching (p 7) (O-2)</p>
Etter (2014)			S					M	M			<p>*EITI only works in places with a strong civil society (Peru, not Mali) (p 4) (O-4)</p> <p>*EITI can only be effective when a functioning civil society is in place prior to EITI implementation and the voluntary nature of the initiative may induce large differences in outcomes between countries. (p 4) (D-1)</p> <p>*Given the impressive growth and expansion of the EITI and the almost univocal subscription of politicians and practitioners to the idea of improving governance through transparency, it is surprising how few efforts have been undertaken to measure the effectiveness of the initiative. (p 3) (I-3)</p>
Fineberg (2014)			M	S								<p>*Two years later, it is not yet clear whether the USEITI (US EITI) Multi-Stakeholders Group (MSG)—a group of 21 selected representatives from government, industry and civil society who are responsible for overseeing US EITI actions—can fulfil the promise of the global EITI and the US President (p 46) (I-3);</p> <p>*Publicly announced, but attracting much less notice, the US EITI MSG also began meeting in 2013 to prepare the candidacy application to join the EITI member nations. (p 50) (I-4)</p>
Ihugba (2014)			M			S						<p>* For a pioneer legislation under the auspices of the EITI, the NEITI Act 2007 has done some commendable job. It has increased Nigeria's potential of improving the lives of its citizens and for making Nigeria a welcoming environment for investors. (p 240) (O2)</p> <p>*The intent is to ensure that an objective analysis is conducted to help all stakeholders take a more critical look at the NEITI law, uphold its benefits, identify and recognize its limitations. This paper has also suggested specific ways to remedy these limitations and actively work toward achieving a more realistic and effective legislation that can actually ensure that a country's natural resource wealth is used for sustainable economic growth for all citizens. (p 242) (I-3)</p>
Öge (2014)		S	M	S		S		S	F		F	<p>*The EITI is a successful undertaking for promoting transparency in under-developed resource-rich countries and Azerbaijan became a pioneer of the initiative early on. However, EITI's limited mandate, especially its disregard for expenditure transparency, hinders the initiative's positive impact on the governance of oil revenues in Azerbaijan. In fact, successful compliance with the EITI initiative has almost no visible impact on corruption and good governance in the country. (p 1483) (I-2; I-3; D-1; D-3); *Finally, but most notably, the EITI allowed civil society groups in Azerbaijan to form a coalition and to join multi-stakeholder meetings along with government representatives and international oil companies. (p 1494) (I-4); *Azerbaijan consistently produced reports without delays (p 1494) (O-2); *Given the space to operate, civil society groups in Azerbaijan help improve resource management. They participate actively in the EITI process, and they raise concerns about other oil-related social and environmental issues. (p 1494) (O-4)</p> <p>*The membership of the EITI has increased very rapidly in the last few years, following the international support it has received. At present, 46 resource-rich countries are affiliated to the EITI, 29 of them with fully compliant status (p 1486) (I-3)</p>
Russell (2014)				S				S				<p>*By the end of 2012, after a vetting process and White House clearance, DOI appointed eight representatives from industry, eight from civil society, and five representatives from government, with slots kept open to allow for future state and tribal representation. (p 32) (I-4)</p>

Poretti (2015)					S	S						*Thanks to this expansion of the EITI disclosure and reporting requirements, in the future, EITI reports should contain data (more or less disaggregated) informing the public on the revenues collected by the government from the sale of natural resources, in addition to revenues from upstream activities. (p 3) (O-1) *Thirdly, Iraq's reporting under EITI goes beyond what is required under the EITI Standard by providing a detailed description of the country's oil sale process. (p 7) (O-2)
Ofori and Lujala (2015)				F			F					None of the interviewees had heard of GHEITI or EITI. The traditional chief had some contact with higher administrative levels, but this had not provided any information about the initiatives. After explaining to the informants the basic idea behind EITI, most were skeptical about how such an initiative could have an impact on their community (p 10) (O-3).
Rich & Moberg (2015)		S	S					M				
Sovacool & Andrews (2015)		S	M			S		M	F	F		*is that it is difficult to attribute governance improvements to the EITI. (D-2) The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has been sold by its advocates as a badly needed way to enhance access to information in the extractive industries sector and improve government accountability. (abstract) (I-2) With regard to our two cases, both countries seemed to be doing better prior to achieving compliant status perhaps because their international reputation was at stake.(p 190) (D-1, D-2) *Instead, the EITI sees 18 governments fully compliant, 19 more considering their candidacy, 60 large energy firms, and more than 900 smaller enterprises participating in a completely voluntary scheme that has the potential to put them at a competitive disadvantage, all in the name of accountability and good governance. [...] however, is that it is difficult to attribute governance improvements to the EITI. (p 190) (I-3) *Particularly in the case of Azerbaijan, it remains unclear how the MSG arrangement can be considered a "partnership" in light of the President's recent changes to the constitution that basically stifle the active participation of civil society in the country. And this is a country that was regarded as an "EITI pioneer" a few years ago (p 191) (O-4)
Sturesson and Zobel (2015)		F	F									The inconsistency between Tullow and total's strong international commitment to the EITI and weak engagement with EITI activities in Uganda needs to be understood in a politico-economic context (p 42) (I-2) *Despite occasional statements from the President and the Minister of Energy and Mineral Development reconfirming this intention, no concrete steps toward an EITI process have been taken (33-34) (I-3)
Westenberg and Gerog-Wagner (2015)						S						*In many aspects, countries have risen to the challenge and become more ambitious and comprehensive in their reporting. However, there remain significant gaps that are holding countries back from seeing meaningful impacts from their EITI processes. (p 25) (O-2)
Andrews (2016)			F					F				Research has shown that the partnership is a limited one since governments have not allowed civil society to participate fully in the process as expected, and in most cases, the general public are not aware of it (p 71) (I-3, O-4)
David-Barret & Okamura (2016)	S	S	S							S		*EITI serves as a reputational intermediary, whereby reformers can signal good intentions and international actors can reward achievement" (I-1)

												<p>The initiative has proved extremely popular, with 23 countries now rated as EITI compliant, 16 having attained candidate status and many others having signaled their commitment to implementing EITI (p 4) (I-2)</p> <p>*Yet EITI has proved extremely popular. As of March 2015, the Initiative had rated 32 countries 'compliant' while 16 more had attained candidate status and several others had signalled their commitment to implementing the standard (s 7) (I-3)</p> <p>*We find evidence that countries attract additional aid when they implement the EITI standard. (p 30) (D-2)</p>	
Kasekende et al (2016)			S							F		<p>The results indicate that there is no evidence of improved corruption scores as a result of EITI membership. In contrast to the EITI goals, member countries of the initiatives are, on average, associated with higher scores, suggesting that the EITI has not yet been successful in reducing corruption in resource rich countries (p 118) (D-1)</p> <p>*EITI members has increased dramatically. By December 2015, there were 49 member countries, of which 31 were listed as compliant countries. Some of these new members include developed countries such as the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) that joined very recently in 2014. (p 118) (I-3)</p>	
Lujala and Epreman (2016)										F		<p>*Based on interviews that we have conducted in Ghana and Liberia, people tend not to be active in trying to access information, even when pertaining to revenues accruing from extraction taking place in the area where they live. Although many express an interest in knowing more about these revenues, few are willing or able to take the necessary steps to access this type of information. (O-3)</p>	
Papayrakis et al 2016			S								S	<p>Our empirical analysis suggests that mineral rich countries that participate in the scheme are more likely to shield themselves against the general tendency of mineral resources to increase corruption (that is, they largely crowd-out the corruption-enhancing effect associated with mineral wealth). We find that this is particularly the case when countries enter the second stage in EITI implementation (and become official candidates). (p11) (D-1)</p> <p>*Over time, there has been an increasing number of countries expressing interest to participate in the EITI scheme. For example, in 2008 there were 23 candidate countries – by 2015, there were 48 member states, 30 of which have already reached a compliant status. (p 12) (I-3)</p>	
Phillips & Whiting (2016)												F	<p>*Their results indicated that the EITI, in its current form, fundamentally fails to assist a country towards sustainable development with respect to the transparent and accountable management of its natural resource wealth (p 262) (D-3).</p>
Sovacool et al (2016)		S	S						F	F	F	F	<p>For the EITI to work, it needs strong civil society institutions. Indeed, even for transparency to work effectively, information must become firmly embedded in the everyday decision-making practices of information producers and consumers, creating a transparency "action cycle". Yet in many countries, especially those most prone to corruption, non-governmental organizations remain disorganized, weak, or even nonexisting (p. 10) (O-4)</p> <p>*The results indicate that, in a strong majority of governance and economic development metrics, EITI countries did not perform better than others. Seven of our hypotheses were rejected, five were partly conformed , and only one was fully confirmed (p 8) (D-1, D-2, D-3).</p> <p>*The EITI has, moreover, contributed toward the solidification of transparency as a global norm in</p>

											international law.(p 3) (I-2) *The relatively broad coverage and participation in the EITI compared with other voluntary schemes relates to the perceived benefits it brings to governments, companies, and communities. (p 3) (I-3)
Öge (2016a)			S						F	S	*The analysis in this paper shows that association with the EITI between 2006 and 2013 increases overall economic transparency, yet it did not have an impact on perceptions of corruption. (O-2, D-1) *The wide popularity of the EITI among resource-rich countries is partially due to its status as a public-private entity. (p 134) (I-3)
Öge (2016b)										S	*This outcome implies that higher percentage of incoming FDI is actually associated with a higher likelihood of EITI membership. (p 137) (D-2)
Neumann et al. (2016)			S	M						S	*The EITI is of relevance to the global transparency and accountability agenda beyond implementation at the national level. The EITI plausibly contributes to global policy frameworks such as the 2030 Agenda of Sustainable Development and especially Goal (“Partnerships for the Goals – Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development”), among others. (p 88) (I-2) *It [EITI] helps governments to understand their options for improving governance; it informs companies and investors about risks; it helps donors to design and steer projects; and it helps civil society to discuss key political issues openly or even overcome political taboos safely. (p 88) (O-2) *[] the EITI is perceived to contribute to: Higher fiscal transparency (by 60% respondents) and an informed public debate (by 52% respondents). (p 59) (O-3) *The natural resource discussion [in DRC] is taking place among elites, but it has yet to “catch flame” throughout the population. For this reason, the proposed theory of change concentrates on major constituencies which play a key role in the country, but as of yet have not been (in this consultant’s view) significantly engaged or engaged enough to bring about the public debate. (p 73) (O-3) *The 2014 EITI Report is only available online and was never produced in a paper version. Several civil society organizations expressed frustration that the very expensive EITI Report was largely not available to its target audience, the Congolese population. (p 70) (O-3) *[] the M-EITI reports have become a reliable source of information for government agencies in their day-to-day work and have informed dialogue of civil society groups about the distribution of revenues assigned to selected districts. (p 82) (O-3) *Going by these assumptions, the analysis shows a significant [positive] effect for a country’s EITI candidate status on the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows, on the time to prepare and pay taxes and on CPIA fiscal policy rating if a candidate of the EITI. (p 56) (D-3) *Global ambition, but BRICS and the largest oil producers absent: Although the EITI is directly relevant in 50 plus countries and thus implemented by the majority of resource-driven countries around the world, there continues to be a notable absence of EITI adoption amongst the BRICS and the largest oil producers globally.(p 8) (I-3)
Bebbington et al. (forthcoming)			S								* By securing rule changes in global EITI standards they have been able to deliver changes in national EITI processes. Even when national political and economic elites feel uncomfortable with some of these changes, it is probably too late for them to withdraw from EITI because too many other benefits are at stake. (p 9) (I-3)

Malden (forthcoming)									S		*This result suggests that EITI participation is a legitimate signal to mining companies that a government is committed to transparent and stable natural resources management that is compliant with an international standard in the extractives industries. (p 6) (D-2)
Öge (forthcoming)							F	F			* Overall, there is a lack of genuine interaction between civil society organizations in Kazakhstan and the public at large (p 5) (O-3) *Interestingly, in both countries civil society groups were influential actors during the founding phase of the EITI. However, the political environment in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan has severely restricted the capacity of civil society groups to carry out their monitoring and whistle-blowing functions as envisaged by the EITI. (p 5) (O-4)
Villar and Papyrakis (forthcoming)									S		*Our empirical analysis suggests that EITI reduced corruption in Zambia, especially during the earlier stages of implementation. In later phases of implementation (candidacy and compliance stages), the EITI effect, though, is statistically insignificant and/or of a small magnitude (p 8) (D-1)
Corrigan (forthcoming)									F	S	*The study finds that the EITI has had a significant and positive effect on economic development in member states since its inception, but these effects have not yet been translated to observable and significant improvements in control of corruption. (p 1) (D-1, D-2)

Part 4. Appendix reference list

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